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Special Commentary
The Lure of Strike
Conrad C. Crane
Abstract: An increasingly important part of the new American Way
of War has been a reliance on standoff technology to project power.
The “lure” is minimal friendly casualties and short, inexpensive wars
with only limited landpower commitments. Unfortunately, inflated
expectations for such an outcome have often led to strategic overreach and a dangerously unbalanced force structure, ultimately costing the nation more blood and treasure. As the United States tries
to refocus its strategy and reduce defense expenditures, it must be
careful to retain a balanced force with a full range of capabilities.

T

here are two approaches to waging war, asymmetric and stupid.
Every competent belligerent looks for an edge over its adversaries.
No country is more asymmetric in warfighting than the United
States. An increasingly important part of the new American Way of War
has been a reliance on stand-off technology to project power, with a
promise of reduced friendly casualties and short, tidy wars with limited
landpower commitments. Unfortunately, this predilection has often led
to strategic overreach and a dangerously unbalanced force structure,
eventually costing the nation much in blood and treasure.
Buoyed by the popular seapower theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan,
and a new maritime strategy to exploit an expanding industrial base, the
US Navy in 1898 showed itself to be a world-class force. In February
of that year, Assistant Secretary of the Navy and ardent expansionist
Theodore Roosevelt took advantage of an afternoon while his boss was
away to order his Asiatic Squadron to wartime readiness. When war
was declared against Spain in April, Admiral George Dewey sailed for
Manila, where on 1 May 1898 his modern flotilla systematically destroyed
Spanish naval power in the Pacific, suffering only one dead and nine
wounded in the process. Though official planning had envisioned the
Philippines as only a secondary theater, Dewey cabled for land forces
to exploit his success. “For tenure of the land you must have the man
with the rifle,” he stated, as Spanish forces still controlled the capital
and the rest of the islands.1 The McKinley administration scrambled to
mobilize soldiers to send to the Pacific. Already stretched by requirements for campaigns in the Caribbean, the Army was forced to cull
together another 20,000 volunteers and regulars under the command of
Major General Wesley Merritt. They arrived in the Philippines during
the summer, soon launching combat operations to secure Manila. By the
time the Philippine-American War ended in 1902, as many as 125,000

1     George Dewey, Autobiography of George Dewey: Admiral of the Navy (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1913), 240.
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American troops had participated, far more than in the projected main
theater in the Caribbean; over 4,000 had died.2
Mahan and his seapower theories, along with burgeoning economic
interests, inspired American leaders to modernize and expand the Navy,
creating a technological impetus for an ambitious strategy during the
Spanish-American War that did not pay adequate attention to landpower
requirements. The invention of the airplane would bring more of the
same. The earliest coherent body of airpower theory was created by the
Italian Giulio Douhet. He advocated that nations invest their defense
resources primarily in an independent air service that would first achieve
“command of the air” over an opponent’s territory and then win wars
quickly by bombing cities until panicked civilians forced their government to capitulate.3 American airmen in the 1930s, however, developed
a different approach based on the promise of precision attacks. Studying
New York City as a model, they concluded that destroying only seventeen targets within its transportation, water, and electrical systems
would render the city uninhabitable without mass casualties. They
expanded their war-winning theory to exploiting key vulnerabilities in
the economies of industrialized nations and developed the precisionbombing concept that has shaped the evolution and application of
American airpower ever since.4
Although not a part of official Army doctrine, the concept became
a part of American plans for World War II when officers in the Air
War Plans Division developed requirements for aerial munitions and
resources to defeat Germany without an invasion and got them attached
to the “Victory Plan” of 1941.5 The 1942 plans called for 273 air groups
to conduct an ambitious bombing program against enemy homelands.
Those demands, combined with the needs of American industry and
the Navy, severely limited the number of ground divisions available for
combat. Instead of the 334 Army divisions projected by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff early in the war, they had to resort to the “Ninety Division
Gamble.” By Victory over Japan (V-J) Day, all 89 active divisions
were deployed and all but two had seen combat. When the Germans
launched their surprise attacks in the Battle of the Bulge and Operation
Nordwind, the American Army in Europe was already desperate for
ground replacements, and was retraining thousands of airmen to be
infantrymen. Even five more total divisions would have made a significant difference for the ground effort, providing a strategic reserve, more
replacements, and flexibility for commanders. If Axis forces had been
able to mount another ground offensive in early 1945, there would have
been no additional American troops available to respond.6 Although the
2     Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United
States of America from 1607 to 2012, revised ed. (New York: Free Press, 1994), 280-313; Howard
K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1956), 61-63; for more on Roosevelt’s ties to Mahan, see Richard W. Turk, The Ambiguous Relationship:
Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan (New York: Greenwood, 1987).
3     For a summary of Douhet’s ideas, see Phillip S. Meilinger, “Giulio Douhet and the Origins of
Airpower Theory,” in The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air
University Press, 1997).
4     Conrad C. Crane, Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1993), 18-22.
5     Ibid., 24-27.
6     Maurice Matloff, “The 90-Division Gamble,” in Command Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts
Greenfield (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1987); Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s
Lieutenants (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 17-20, 963-968.
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air forces made significant contributions to the war effort they were not
as decisive as projected, and much effort was redundant or wasted. Even
when the Army Air Forces reached their peak deployment level in April
1945, only 90 percent of available combat air groups had been deployed
overseas, (and only 224 of the 273 planned), and not all to combat theaters. When the war ended, 12,000 unused first-line aircraft were sitting
on airfields at home, one third of the total available for service.7
After the conclusion of the war, the US Strategic Bombing Survey,
an apparently objective evaluation of airpower that in reality was
stacked to support Air Force desires for independence, provided plenty
of evidence so airpower supporters could trumpet its successes while
blaming shortsighted targeting and bombing restrictions for its lack of
decisiveness. They argued counterfactually that earlier focus on objectives
like oil or electric power would have brought victory through airpower in
Europe, and extended city bombing or transportation attacks would have
forced Japan to capitulate without dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki.8
The other consistent theme for postwar claims was that new technology promised even better results from air attacks in the future, in
this case through the use of atomic bombs; this lure proved especially
attractive for decisionmakers trying to maintain American military
power and save money. Despite postwar defense cutbacks, considerable
expenditures were committed to strengthening Strategic Air Command
for nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union. As a result, when North Korea
attacked south in 1950, the United States had an Army unprepared for
“that kind of war,” and an Air Force so focused on strategic bombing
that it had to retrain and reconfigure to perform theater air missions
or close air support. Concentrating on technological “silver bullets”
can distort any service. With key strategic targets off limits for political
reasons, alternative approaches like aerial interdiction failed to achieve
desired results. One of the key findings at the MacArthur hearings was
that “too much was expected of the air.”9
As airmen searched for valid targets that could influence enemy
decisionmaking, they escalated operations against cities and “dual-use”
military-civilian targets, a trend in most American air wars, including the Kosovo campaign. Asian expert Selig Harrison claims that a
primary justification for the current North Korean nuclear and missile
programs is the desire to deter another bombing campaign like the one
that wrecked all their cities and towns from 1950-1953.10
Though there was no organized evaluation of American bombing
in Korea, the United States Air Force (USAF) claimed without any
real evidence that its “Air Pressure” campaign against hydroelectric
plants, cities, and irrigation dams had been decisive in persuading the
Communists to agree to the 1953 armistice. President Eisenhower
7     Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II: Vol. VI – Men
and Planes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948-58), 424.
8     Gian P. Gentile, How Effective is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo (New
York: New York University Press, 2001), 33-166.
9      Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953 (Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 2000), 14-39, 74-75, 80-92, 127.
10      Selig Harrison, “The Missiles of North Korea: How Real a Threat?” World Policy Journal 17
(Fall 2000): 13-24.

8

Parameters 43(2) Summer 2013

believed his threats to use atomic bombs had really done that, and the
USAF took advantage of his leanings toward reliance on such weapons
and desire to cut the defense budget to become the big winner in the
“New Look” defense programs of the 1950s.11 The nation’s resulting
decline in conventional capability encouraged adversaries to develop
nontechnological approaches that were successful in Cuba, Laos, and
Vietnam. Again Strategic Air Command benefited, and again the USAF
entered a limited war in Vietnam with doctrine, equipment, and training
inadequate for its combat requirements. The Army also suffered from its
own abortive experimentation with the lure of the “Pentomic Division,”
in addition to structural deficiencies resulting from budget reductions.12
This time it was the Johnson administration believing in a technological chimera and placing high hopes on airpower. The subsequent
failures of aerial interdiction and Operation Rolling Thunder repeated
lessons from Korea. In 1954, in response to French requests for support,
Army Chief of Staff General Matthew Ridgway warned that initial reliance on airpower to solve problems in Indochina would lead to extensive
ground force commitments, and his prescience was very evident a decade
later. The apparent success of Operations Linebacker I and Linebacker
II near the end of the Vietnam War in 1972 allowed proponents of airpower to claim decisiveness in forcing enemy acceptance of peace terms.
Mark Clodfelter, however, demonstrated that the bombing campaigns
were probably most effective at reassuring South Vietnamese leaders
and obtaining their approval of the Paris Peace Accords. The North
Vietnamese did not lose anything after delaying their own signing of the
agreement. President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger expected American
airpower would be the guarantor of South Vietnamese independence,
but by 1975 political constraints prevented its use to save the beleaguered
country. Even if it had been available, the backlash from more bombing
would have probably been counterproductive by coalescing domestic
and international opposition against it.13
USAF leaders complained that they could have won the Vietnam
War by themselves in two weeks if allowed to bomb the way they
wanted.14 Despite such arguments, the Carter-Reagan build-up produced
a balanced force structure with multiple capabilities that performed
brilliantly in Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm. AirLand Battle
doctrine orchestrated a powerful synergy of joint forces. Fixed in place
by the Allied ground threat in the Gulf War, the Iraqi army was pummeled by weeks of air strikes that severely weakened it. Still, the key
Republican Guard was relatively untouched and needed to be decimated
by the overwhelming 100-hour ground assault that drove out the invading forces. Before the dust settled on a liberated Kuwait, airpower
proponents like Merrill McPeak and Richard Hallion were heralding
the beginning of a new era where airpower using stealth and precision
11     Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 110-131, 155-173.
12     Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Crosswinds: The Air Force’s Setup in Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M
University Press, 1993); Millett and Maslowski, For the Common Defense, 531-563.
13     Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 178-180; “What Ridgway Told Ike,” US News and
World Report, June 25, 1954, 30-33; Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of
North Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 177-210; Stanley I. Kutler, Review of Larry Berman’s
No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam, in Washington Post Book World, July 29,
2001, p. T5.
14     Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower, 206-207.
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munitions could defeat field armies, hold ground, and win wars on its
own.15 When the Gulf War Air Power Survey found that many airpower
claims were exaggerated, the USAF limited the report’s publication.16
Operations in the Balkans in the 1990s again elicited a combination
of triumphalist claims for modern technology and complaints about
targeting restrictions. Misperceptions about the accomplishments of
airpower in Operation Deliberate Force contributed to exaggerated
expectations for Operation Allied Force. The key element that brought
the Serbs to agree to the Dayton Accords was not the brief bombing
campaign, but the rampage of the Croatian and Bosnian armies into
Serb-held territory. Airpower without landpower had failed miserably to
save Srebrenica, for instance, and USAF leaders were very cautious not to
promise decisive results before Operation Deliberate Force started, but
soon afterwards the most zealous airmen were using their interpretation
of the bombing to make their usual claims of independent decisiveness.17
These exaggerations reinforced perceptions in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) that airpower alone could achieve alliance goals in Kosovo. That unfortunate decision cost the lives of many
Kosovars. President Clinton announced to the nation that the bombing
operation had three primary objectives: to stop the ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo, to prevent an even bloodier Serbian offensive against civilians
there, and to “seriously damage” the Serbian military capacity to do such
harm.18 Bombing did not achieve any of those goals, and in fact helped
exacerbate the second.
There is a wide consensus that the air campaign did very little
damage to Serb forces in Kosovo, and what success it did achieve in
finally forcing a settlement came from the massive destruction it
wreaked in the Yugoslav civilian infrastructure made possible by the
bombing of the “dual-use” targets mentioned earlier.19 The president of
the World Bank expressed concern about the ability of his organization
to fund repairs of the billions of dollars in damage from the bombing,
and the destruction of transportation and industrial facilities had economic repercussions throughout the region.20 Additionally, the Belgrade
Center for Human Rights predicted, “the biggest collateral damage will
be the shattered possibilities for democracy in Serbia,” because of the

15     See for example Richard Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, DC:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 241-244, 251-254. McPeak was quoted in the March 16, 1991
Washington Post as proclaiming, “This is the first time in history that a field army has been defeated
by airpower.” Ray Sibbald, “The Air War,” in The Gulf War Assessed, ed. John Pimlott and Stephen
Badsey (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1992), 122-123.
16     Gentile, 188-190.
17     Paul Forage, “Bombs for Peace: A Comparative Study of the Use of Airpower in the
Balkans,” Armed Forces and Society 28 (Winter 2002): 211-232; see also the voluminous study Balkan
Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990-1995 published by the Office of Russian
and European Analysis of the Central Intelligence Agency in May 2002.
18     William J. Clinton speech, The New York Times, page A15, March 25, 1999.
19     See for instance Steven Lee Myers, “Damage to Serb Military Less Than Expected,” The New
York Times, June 28, 1999, 1; Richard J. Newman, “The bombs that failed in Kosovo,” U.S. News
and World Report 127 (Sept. 20, 1999): 28-30. For a brilliant exposition on the course and implications of the Kosovo air campaign, see Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (New York:
Metropolitan Books, 2000)
20      Tribune News Services, “World Bank: Rebuilding Balkans Comes at a Cost,” Chicago Tribune,
July 14, 1999, 5.
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backlash against Western values resulting from the perceived brutality
of the air campaign. 21
Airmen again were cautious at the beginning of Operation Allied
Force about predicting a quick victory, instead complaining that political
restrictions were holding them back, as the air war expanded to 34,000
sorties over 78 days. However, afterwards they widely circulated the
remarks by historian John Keegan that the results “proved that a war can
be won by airpower alone.”22 The Air Force Association quickly published
a well-illustrated pamphlet entitled “The Kosovo Campaign: Aerospace
Power Made It Work,” which conveniently neglected to mention that
the air campaign failed to meet the initial goals set for it or to achieve
a settlement as comprehensive as the one President Milosevic rejected
at Rambouillet. It also did not emphasize problems with weather, intelligence, bomb damage assessment, and technical failures that continued
to affect air operations, and downplayed any contributions from diplomacy or the threat of ground action in ending the conflict.23 Overzealous
proponents of airpower also ignore the international clamor always
caused by their bombing. A study by the Project on Defense Alternatives
concluded that excessive reliance on strategic air attacks leads to “more
mistakes of strategic import, increased turmoil within coalitions, bigger
postwar aftershocks, and international disapprobation.”24 Much of
this negative reaction comes from perceptions of excessive collateral
damage. Enemies in recent conflicts have become very adept at displaying images of shattered mosques and dead children, and blaming them
on American military actions. While landpower can be just as guilty as
airpower in causing such damage, who controls the ground controls the
message, and ground forces are much more able to quickly stabilize such
situations and ensure they are properly reported.
In addition, it must be noted that although airpower was the main
American military contribution to coerce successful negotiations ending
the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, extensive landpower commitments
were still necessary to make the agreements work. The 1st Armored
Division was part of a force of 60,000 NATO troops deployed to stabilize Bosnia. President Clinton’s announcement that US involvement
in the operation would last less than a year was wishful thinking at
best, political chicanery at worst. Although the Stabilization Force was
finally terminated in 2004, the European Union maintains peacekeepers
there today.25 The Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1999 consisted of 30,000
NATO troops to keep the peace after Milosevic relented, not including the Russian forces who also raced into the province. The main
American base there remains Camp Bondsteel. KFOR and the United
21      Bert Roughton, Jr., “Yugoslavs Still Bitter Toward U.S.,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, March
25, 2001, 25.
22     John Keegan, “Please Mr. Blair, never take such a risk again,” London Daily Telegraph, June 6,
1999.
23     Rebecca Grant, The Kosovo Campaign: Aerospace Power Made It Work (Arlington, VA: Air Force
Association, 1999). For some differing opinions on the results and impacts of the bombing campaign by two RAND researchers, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and
Operational Assessment (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001) and Stephen T. Hosmer, The Conflict Over Kosovo:
Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did (Sant Monica: RAND, 2001).
24     Carl Conetta, “Disengaged Warfare: Should we make a virtue of the Kosovo way of war?”
(Project on Defense Alternatives, May 21, 2001), http://www.comw.org/pda/0105bm21.html.
25     Mark A. Viney, United States Cavalry Peacekeepers in Bosnia: An Inside Account of Operation Joint
Endeavor, 1996 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2012), 20-27. The European Union mission in Bosnia is
called Operation Althea. Information about it can be found at http://www.euforbih.org .
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Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, established for an
initial period of 12 months in June 1999, still exist.26 In the long run
the stability preserved by these extended ground commitments must
be judged worth the cost, but they were not projected when American
airpower was initially committed to the operations.
Inflated expectations from technology leading to strategic overreach
and unexpected ground commitments, so evident in our past history,
played out in both Afghanistan and Iraq over the last decade. The speed
of the Taliban’s collapse in the former, facilitated by American Special
Forces calling in airstrikes from horseback, surprised everyone, and
encouraged Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his supporters who envisioned a defense establishment relying heavily on precision
strikes while saving money by significantly cutting ground forces. They
were much attracted by the arguments about technological overmatch
expounded by Harlan Ullman, James Wade, and others in their book
Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance. Despite warnings from analysts
about drawing too many conclusions from the unique Afghan scenario or
expecting too much from technology, Rumsfeld sent Douglas Macgregor
to United States Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters in early
2002 to argue that a 15,000-man armor-heavy ground force would be
enough to conquer Baghdad, with an additional 15,000 infantry added
later to stabilize the country after the regime fell.27
Under Rumsfeld’s unrelenting pressure, the number of ground
forces planned for the invasion of Iraq declined substantially. In both
Afghanistan and Iraq, nonexistent or inadequate plans for what happened
after the end of major combat, “Phase IV operations,” and insufficient
ground force commitments, resulted in messy aftermaths and a decade
of complex counterinsurgency that no one wanted or expected, to a large
extent the result of inflated expectations for the capabilities of military
technology of political and military leaders.28
Recent security actions by President Obama and his administration
demonstrate a strong inclination to avoid this historic pattern, primarily
by choosing not to commit landpower, even though the lure of standoff
strike remains an attractive military option. Emphasis on Air-Sea Battle
with the “rebalance” to the Pacific implies that significant land activities
will not be essential to achieve military objectives in that important
region. The recent campaign to bring down the Gaddhafi regime in Libya
shows a willingness to apply airpower to support indigenous forces, as
in Afghanistan, while accepting continued turmoil in the country, the
destabilization of neighboring states like Mali, and the proliferation of
26     Ignatieff, 93-94, 207. See websites http://www.unmikonline.org and http://www.aco.nato.
int/kfor.aspx
27     Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002); Dale R. Herspring, Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of
Power (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 18-115; Harlan Ullman et al., Shock and Awe:
Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1996); Michael R. Gordon and General
Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon
Books, 2006), 33-36.
28     There are many good accounts of the inadequacy of post-major combat planning and
execution in Afghanistan and Iraq. Besides books cited in the previous endnote, see Thomas E.
Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penquin, 2006); Gordon W. Rudd,
Reconstructing Iraq: Regime Change, Jay Garner, and the ORHA Story (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 2011); and Rajiv Chandrasekeran, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan (New
York: Alfred A Knopf, 2012).
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weapons in the region, as acceptable risks or outcomes too difficult or
expensive to prevent with our own ground commitment. The refusal to
intervene at all in the morass of Syria is another way to avoid overreach,
though the ongoing chaos is ugly and deadly. There is, however, another
possible way to view these options. It is obvious that the United States
cannot count on indigenous forces or allies to advance our interests.
Though ground commitments are often very messy, an early deployment
of sizeable professional American land forces can control a situation
before it spirals out of control, preserve our interests, and allow others to
take over long-term constabulary roles. The key question for American
decisionmakers is “How much chaos are you willing to accept in the
world, and where?” If stability in a region in turmoil is deemed in our
national interest, that will not be achieved by long-range strikes.
As part of the usual national backlash against major wars, there will
be an inevitable cut in the number of active American ground forces.
The Army grew by 90,000 soldiers in the last decade to meet demands
in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it is probably correct that there should
be reductions as the wars wind down. The slowness of that growth,
however, reveals an important truth about contemporary myths regarding how quickly the United States can expand its military forces. In the
past, the armed forces were able to endure significant peacetime cuts
and still meet increased requirements for a crisis because of an effective
Selective Service system and a robust industrial base. Neither of those
exists today. Force structure decisions made in the current fiscally constrained environment for the Total Force will be impossible to augment
in a timely manner if the strategic assumptions on which they are based
are flawed. Decisionmakers must be careful to maintain enough military
power to handle all contingencies, even those involving major ground
forces. A balanced joint force allows a choice of asymmetries to exploit.
Eventually, chaos somewhere will be unacceptable to national interests,
and again will require significant landpower involvement. Or the lure of
easy results through standoff technology might again lead to an unintended complex conflict in an unexpected place. When that time comes,
hopefully American political leaders seeking “more bang for the buck”
will not have been seduced by exorbitant expectations of technology,
or the nation and its allies will pay the price in blood and treasure, and
perhaps even strategic failure. Those are the costs of an unbalanced force
structure and a lack of the full range of military capabilities.

